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ABSTRACT
When judging nutritional aspects of foods, perceivers tend to overgeneralize from one 
“healthy” nutrition claim (e.g., “no cholesterol”) by assuming that foods feature other 
healthy attributes as well (e.g., low in fat). This finding has been discussed in terms of the 
classic halo effect in person perception, whereby impressions from strongly valenced 
attributes (e.g., social warmth) evoke similarly valenced evaluations of the target person 
on other attributes (e.g., sociability). Despite their popularity and health associations, 
scant research has explored whether claims like “organic” and “fair trade”—known as 
values-based claims—can similarly bias judgment. This dissertation explores this 
possibility. Specifically, despite being silent on nutrient content, values-based claims and 
other ethics-related production qualities (e.g., favorable worker treatment) are expected to 
promote unwarranted health inferences (e.g., reduced calorie estimates), especially when 
these qualities are personally relevant (i.e., strongly congruent or incongruent with 
perceivers’ personal values). Five experimental studies find support for this prediction. 
Describing cookies as “organic” decreases calorie judgments and thereby increases 
consumption recommendations, an effect that is larger among the pro-environmental 
(Studies 1 and 2). Extending to the social ethics domain, describing chocolate as “fair-
trade” decreases calorie judgments; moreover, socially unethical production increases 
calorie judgments, among perceivers reporting high ethical food values (Studies 3 and 4). 
Exploring effects on downstream choice outcomes, exercise is deemed less important 
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after a person chooses “organic” over conventional dessert, an effect that correlates 
positively with pro-environmentalism (Study 5). Overall, larger bias was observed among 
perceivers with strongly congruent (or incongruent) personal values, or those who likely 
felt especially positively (or negatively) toward the focal qualities, consistent with the 
logic of halo effects. Amid the ongoing obesity crisis, these findings reveal ethical health 
halos that lead perceivers to see nutritionally poor but ethically produced foods as 




The ethical implications of product choice are on Americans’ minds and food 
packages like never before. Take, for example, the rapid growth of the organic food 
industry, which saw U.S. sales rise from approximately $1 billion in 1990 to $25 billion 
in 2009 (OTA, 2010), reflecting growing concerns about the negative environmental 
consequences of conventional food production. Beyond “organic” and other claims 
conveying environmentally ethical production standards, known as eco-labels (e.g., “bird 
friendly” coffee; Lefferts & Heinicke, 1996), claims conveying socially ethical 
production (“fair trade,” “no child labor”) as well as a combination of environmental and 
social values (“locally produced”) are increasingly commonplace. Collectively known as 
values-based claims (Barham, 2002), these labels signal difficult-to-discern production 
qualities related to socioeconomic progressivism that are likely to enter the utility 
functions of many consumers but are typically ignored in standard utility models 
(DiMaggio, 1994). 
Although this is an age of enlightened food options, it is also one of pronounced 
confusion about food. Approximately 33% of Americans now meet the government’s 
criteria for obesity (Flegal, Carroll, Ogden, & Curtin, 2010), up from 23% two decades 
ago (CDCP, 2008), and obesity-related illnesses, such as heart disease and diabetes, are 
among the leading causes of death in the United States (CDCP, 2010a). Scholars 
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interested in the cognitive factors underlying excessive weight gain have suggested that 
calorie underestimation may be a contributing factor (Lichtman, Pisarska, Berman et al., 
1992; Young & Nestle, 2002; Livingstone & Black, 2003), and in this vein, research 
finds that “healthy” nutrition claims (e.g., “low-fat”) can lead consumers to erroneously 
infer that those foods contain fewer calories (e.g., Wansink & Chandon, 2006a). Despite 
the heightened popularity of “organic” and other values-based claims, scant research has 
investigated whether such claims can similarly evoke health halos, perhaps encouraging 
consumers to eat more than they otherwise would.
This dissertation explores this possibility. Drawing on the person perception 
literature on halo effects and consumer research on overgeneralizations from nutrition 
claims, I hypothesize that values-based claims—despite being silent on nutrient content 
including calorie content—can bias calorie estimates and other health-related judgments. 
Moreover, because values-based claims might be considered peripheral qualities, or 
attributes that are unlikely to strongly and uniformly influence subsequent evaluations 
during impression formation (Asch, 1946), health halos from values-based claims are 
expected to emerge especially among perceivers whose personal values are highly 
congruent (or incongruent) with the claim, who are likely to feel especially favorably (or 
unfavorably) toward the claim in the first place (e.g., “organic” halos among the pro-
environmental). Note that there is a compelling alternative hypothesis: perceivers with 
highly claim-relevant personal values presumably know more about the claim and thus 
may be less susceptible to these unwarranted healthy inferences because they should 
realize that the focal claim (“organic”) is irrelevant to the judgment at hand (calorie 
content). The present research tests these competing predictions. By predicting that these 
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effects depend on the perceivers’ personal values or predisposition toward the claim, it 
also examines an assumed but often untested factor in halo effects. 
It is important to note that judging “organic” and “fair trade” foods as lower-
calorie would be warranted if such foods did in fact contain fewer calories on average. 
This is a reasonable possibility, given that companies routinely align the nutritional 
profile of packaged foods positioned as healthy options in the marketplace. However, the 
available evidence suggests that the calorie content of organic and fair trade foods likely 
matches that of their conventional counterparts (FMI, 2006; Roberto, unpublished data). 
In the following section, I review relevant literature and discuss the theoretical 
rationale for the current work before outlining the experimental hypotheses.
Halo effects in person perception
In his classic demonstration of the halo effect, Asch (1946) read participants a list 
of adjectives describing a target person that included a positive or negative central quality 
(e.g., “warm” vs. “cold”) and solicited evaluations of the target on various personality 
dimensions. Results showed that the “warm” targets were judged as more generous, 
sociable, and good-natured than were the “cold” targets. In related work on the power of 
first impressions, Kelley (1950) told students that a guest lecturer was known “…to be a 
rather ‘warm’ [‘cold’] person, industrious, critical, practical, and determined” (p. 433). In 
addition to replicating Asch’s findings, Kelley found that the warm versus cold 
manipulation affected students’ behavior toward the target: 56% of students in the warm 
condition subsequently participated in the class discussion compared to just 32% in the 
cold condition. In later work manipulating social warmth behaviorally rather than 
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descriptively, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) found that a target was judged more favorably 
on his physical appearance, mannerisms, and accent when he behaved in a warm fashion, 
demonstrating that warmth halos can bias evaluations even when perceivers have ample 
independent information on which to base their judgments. 
In addition to warmth, research demonstrates powerful halos arising from 
physical attractiveness. In their demonstration of the “what-is-beautiful-is-good” effect, 
Dion, Berscheid, and Walster (1972) presented participants with photographs of people 
high, low, or intermediate on physical attractiveness and solicited judgments of the 
targets’ personalities and likelihood of success in various life domains. Results showed 
that attractive targets were judged to have more sociable personalities as well as better 
marriage and career prospects. In follow-up work, Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid (1977) 
suggested that attractive individuals might actually be more sociable in part because 
perceivers’ actions toward beautiful people might elicit behavior that is consistent with 
the “beautiful-is-good” stereotype. They had male participants speak via telephone with a 
female (research confederate) who they believed to be either attractive or unattractive on 
the basis of an experimentally manipulated photograph. Analysis of the taped 
conversations revealed the self-fulfilling nature of beauty halos: the woman behaved 
more warmly and sociably when the male participants believed that she was beautiful. 
Given that physical attractiveness is among a person’s most salient characteristics (Dion 
et al., 1972) and that it likely evokes a uniformly positive response across perceivers 
(Aharon, Etcoff, Ariely, et al., 2001), it would appear that physical beauty—like warmth
—may be considered a central quality in person perception (Asch, 1946), on which the 
construal of other qualities depends and which is capable of influencing a wide range of 
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specific evaluations. This is in contrast to a peripheral quality mentioned earlier, on 
which the construal of other qualities does not depend and which has more limited 
influence over specific evaluations (e.g., when Asch replaced the central qualities 
“warm” and “cold” with the peripheral qualities “polite” and “blunt,” the effect on 
subsequent evaluations was dramatically reduced).
Although central qualities influence a wider range of evaluations than do 
peripheral qualities, evidence that they cast a universally positive or negative glow over 
all evaluations—a true halo effect—is elusive, even in the seminal work described above. 
Kelley (1950) points out like Asch (1946) before him that his data show a differential 
effect of the warm-cold manipulation across specific evaluations: warm targets were seen 
as more good-natured and popular but not as more self-assured or intelligent. 
Foreshadowing more explicitly cognitive work on activation theory (Collins & Loftus, 
1975), Kelley speculated that the halo effect “seems to depend upon the closeness of the 
relation between the specific dimension of any given rating scale and the central 
quality…” (p. 435). 
Kelley’s point about concept proximity in the associative network is relevant to 
the current hypotheses. Perceivers may not overgeneralize from a values-based claim 
(e.g., “organic”) or another ethical quality (e.g., favorable worker treatment) as they do 
from a relative nutrition claim (e.g., “low fat”) because values/ethical qualities speak to a 
food’s production process, which may be too far removed from nutrient-related concepts 
in the associative network to exert an effect. However, ethical production labels may bias 
nutrient inferences to a greater extent among certain perceivers, namely those whose 
personal values are strongly congruent or incongruent with the values/ethics labeling. 
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That is, values/ethical labels may function as peripheral qualities in impression 
formation, given that they are not core qualities of foods that are sought by all consumers 
but instead matter especially to a subset who may be motivated to view these foods in a 
favorable or unfavorable light. Thus, even though production-related qualities may not 
bias nutrient-related inferences across perceivers in general, they may do so among a 
subset of perceivers with relevant personal values. These points are discussed in further 
detail below.
Health halos from relative nutrition claims
Spurred by the passage of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) of 
1990 which was intended to increase the transparency of nutritional information and to 
provide regulatory oversight for food advertising claims, numerous studies have 
examined the ways that consumers process and react to food labeling (e.g., Moorman, 
1996; Andrews, Netemeyer, & Burton, 1998; Roe, Levy, & Derby, 1999; Garretson & 
Burton, 2000). Although the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) promptly issued 
guidelines for relative nutrition claims such as “high fiber” and “low cholesterol,” 
government officials continued to express concern that consumers might misinterpret 
them (FTC, 1994). In this vein, research finds that margarine advertised as low in 
cholesterol is erroneously perceived as low in fat (Andrews et al., 1998), an example of 
the so-called “health halo” effect (Andrews, Burton, & Netemeyer, 2000; Chandon & 
Wansink, 2007).
Amid rising concerns about excessive weight gain and obesity-related illnesses, 
recent research has examined whether relative nutrition claims paradoxically promote 
6
calorie underestimation and overeating. Wansink and Chandon (2006a) found that “low-
fat” labels on snack foods (M&Ms, granola) lead to decreased calorie estimates, 
increased perceptions of serving size, and increased caloric intake. In addition, consumers 
have been shown to underestimate the calorie content of sandwiches from brands 
marketed as healthy (Subway) relative to sandwiches from other brands (McDonalds), 
increasing the likelihood that they will order calorie-dense side dishes and a higher-
calorie meal overall from the “healthy” restaurant (Chandon & Wansink, 2007).
In contrast to central qualities in person perception (e.g., social warmth), the 
appeal of nutrition claims may vary across perceivers. For instance, consumers on 
restricted diets or those looking to lose weight may hold especially favorable attitudes 
toward low fat foods, perhaps evoking larger health halos among this group. Consistent 
with this expectation, a closer look at the Wansink and Chandon (2006a) findings is 
suggestive. Although the authors conclude that the effect of the “low-fat” claim was 
equivalent across normal weight and overweight participants, their Study 2 data (p. 610) 
reveal that the interaction with weight approached significance (p = .10), such that the 
claim’s largest effect occurred among overweight participants judging M&Ms (Mregular = 
1377 vs. Mlow-fat = 942).1 This pattern suggests that relative nutrition claims may be 
conceptualized as peripheral qualities that exert greater influence when the claim is 
personally relevant (and when people are motivated to view desired targets positively).  
1 The authors do not report the three-way interaction between claim (low-fat vs. no claim), specific food 
(candy vs. granola), and participant BMI (normal weight vs. overweight) or the simple effect of claim on 
M&M judgments by overweight participants.
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Health halos from values-based claims? 
Whether values-based claims such as “organic” and “fair trade” are capable of 
activating health halos remains an open question. Consistent with activation theory 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975) and Kelley’s (1950) speculations about the proximity of 
evaluation dimensions to the central quality, specific nutrient claims (e.g., “no 
cholesterol”) have been shown to affect judgments of closely associated nutrients (fat) 
but not of more general, distal concepts (cancer risk) (Andrews et al., 1998). As 
mentioned above, “organic” and other production-related information (e.g., favorable 
worker treatment) may be seen as unlikely to activate “calories” and other nutrient-
related concepts from this perspective.
On the other hand, there are a number of reasons to expect that values-based 
claims may indeed affect nutrient-related judgments, including judgments of calorie 
content. First, claims such as “organic” and “fair-trade” carry strong connotations of 
healthiness in contemporary America, associations that are promoted by marketers and 
reflected in survey data revealing that a majority of Americans endorse organic foods as 
“healthier” (Harris Interactive, 2007). In addition, more natural foods, as opposed to 
those altered by humans in some significant way, tend to be seen as inherently good and 
healthy (Rozin, Spranca, Krieger, et al., 2004); as such, generalized “organic” halos seem 
plausible given the back-to-nature connotations of organic production, associations that 
may extend to “fair trade” given that these claims reflect overlapping values (Raynolds, 
2000) and frequently co-occur on food packages. Second, because calorie estimation is 
cognitively demanding (Livingstone & Black, 2003; Berman & Lavizzo-Mourey, 2008), 
consumers may even substitute the associatively related attribute “healthy” when 
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processing values-based claims like “organic” in order to simplify their calorie judgment, 
consistent with attribute substitution as a general judgment heuristic (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002). 
Third, consumers may go beyond the literal meaning of the producer’s claim 
(Grice, 1975; Schwarz, 1996) and infer that a producer who adheres to ethical production 
standards may also care about health-related aspects of the product (Wansink & 
Chandon, 2006a). Beyond any specific ethical = healthy heuristic rooted in 
conversational logic, consumers may more generally take the presence of an advertising 
claim that is only vaguely related to the judgment at hand as an implicit persuasive appeal 
on the part of producers (Wänke & Reutner, 2010); given that producers routinely 
attempt to position their products as healthy and that consumers likely assume that many 
people desire healthier options, virtually any advertising claim may lead perceivers to 
infer that the product is healthier than similar products that do not bear the claim.
Fourth, the related literature on corporate social responsibility demonstrates that 
consumers are prone to positive attributions for a company’s behavior when the firm has 
behaved ethically in the past (Klein & Dawar, 2004), an ethical halo that may extend 
beyond evaluations of companies and brands and promote unwarranted inferences about 
the nutrient content and health consequences of their products. 
Implicit in the above reasoning is that “low-calorie” and “healthy” are nearly 
synonymous in calorie-rich contemporary Western cultures (Crawford & Krebs, 2008), 
and as such, the inference that ethical foods are lower-calorie may readily follow from 
their “good”/“healthy” associations. Although not explicitly examined here, the meaning 
of “healthy” is expected to vary across contexts, and in turn, the specific nutrient-related 
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inferences (e.g., calorie content) are expected to shift accordingly. For instance, it is not 
difficult to imagine contexts in which “high-calorie” may be a highly desirable and 
healthy quality of foods, as it may be in developing nations where malnutrition far 
outranks obesity as a public health concern. I return to this point in the next section.
Health halos for some or all? The moderating role of personal values
Although the above considerations point to generalized halo effects of values-
based claims, the effects likely depend on perceivers’ personal values. As mentioned 
above, attitudes toward “organic” and other values-based claims are likely more variable 
than are attitudes toward central qualities in person perception (e.g., social warmth) 
(Chen, 2009). Given that halo logic presumes that focal qualities elicit strongly valenced 
impressions, values-based halos may be most pronounced among individuals who value 
and feel positively about the claim in the first place (e.g., “organic” claims among pro-
environmentalists) (see Figure 1 for the conceptual model). These general positive (and 
negative) impressions are expected to activate associatively related “healthy” (and 
“unhealthy”) inferences that may be unwarranted—for example, that snacks are lower-
calorie when they are “organic” and that chocolate is higher-calorie when produced in 
socially unethical ways. These specific inferences, in turn, are expected to have 
downstream consequences on choice outcomes that can be conceptualized as indulgent 
versus resistant and that manifest, for example, in the form of higher versus lower 
consumption recommendations and ultimately as higher versus lower consumption. 
Importantly, these general positive and negative impressions are not expected to 
evoke the same “healthy” and “unhealthy” inferences across contexts. In line with a 
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situated cognition perspective on judgment and decision making (Smith & Semin, 2004; 
Schwarz, 2007), the meaning of “healthy” is conceived as highly context-dependent—for 
instance, whereas “low-calorie” is strongly associated with healthy in calorie-rich 
cultures such as the United States, the same attribute is likely construed as unhealthy in 
contexts where calories are scarce, such as during times of famine or in developing 
nations where malnutrition is a pressing public health concern. Although the present 
work is conducted within a calorie-rich culture where “low-calorie” is considered healthy 
(Crawford & Krebs, 2008), cultural associations and meanings are likely crucial to 
predicting perceivers’ specific nutrient-related inferences and downstream choice 
outcomes arising from values-based claims.
If supported, the person values model—which predicts greater bias among 
perceivers with relevant personal values—would carry interesting theoretical implications 
for dual-process theories of human judgment. These theories generally distinguish 
between two types of cognitive systems, one that is relatively fast, intuitive, and 
automatic (termed System 1) and one that is relatively slow, deliberative, and controlled 
(System 2) (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Sloman, 1996; see Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999 and Stanovich & West, 2000 for reviews). In general, these models assume 
that System 1 guides judgment most of the time and that System 2 comes online when 
people are sufficiently knowledgeable, motivated, or capable of deeper processing.
Thus, dual-process models would predict that heuristic cues should exert less 
influence among perceivers whose personal values are aligned with the values-based 
claim for at least two reasons. First, high personal relevance typically motivates 
perceivers to overlook heuristic cues in favor of deeper processing (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, 
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Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986). Second, high personal relevance in the present domain of 
ethical foods presumably correlates positively with knowledge, which should lead 
perceivers to realize that the values-based claim is irrelevant to the focal judgment (e.g., 
because of its personal relevance, pro-environmentalists presumably prefer “organic” and 
know what it means). Dual-process theories would predict that this relevance should 
protect pro-environmentalists from unwarranted healthy inferences (e.g., “organic” = 
“low-calorie”) by eliciting deliberative processing and the realization that the claim does 
not bear on the focal judgment. In contrast, halo theory would predict that pro-
environmentalists should be more vulnerable to these unwarranted inferences because 
their strongly positive impression, evoked by the claim, may spill over and affect their 
evaluations on unrelated dimensions. In sum, values-based health halos may occur among 
perceivers with claim-relevant values despite their superior knowledge, which dual-
process models predict should buffer them from the hypothesized bias. 
Five experimental studies were designed to test for health halos from values-
based claims. Specifically, these studies examine some of the key components of the 
person values model by testing the following four hypotheses:
(1) Despite being silent on calorie content, the same food product will be judged 
as lower-calorie when it bears a values-based claim (e.g., “organic”). A main effect of 
values-based claims on specific “healthy” inferences (e.g., “low-calorie”) is expected to 
the extent that the claim carries strong associations of “good”/“healthy” for most 
perceivers. Given the popularity of organic foods coupled with their widespread healthy 
associations (Harris Interactive, 2007), “organic” may decrease calorie judgments 
regardless of their personal environmental values. Nevertheless, the effect is expected to 
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be more pronounced among those high in pro-environmentalism, following halo logic 
(see 2 below).
(2) The effect of values-based claims on health-related inferences (e.g., calorie 
content) will be moderated by personal values, such that perceivers with claim-congruent 
values will be more likely to provide unwarranted healthy judgments (e.g., reduced 
calorie estimates). As mentioned above, this hypothesis follows from halo logic by 
acknowledging that qualities should evoke halos to the extent that they elicit strongly 
valenced impressions among perceivers. Just as the peripheral qualities “polite” and 
“blunt” have a weaker influence on subsequent impressions than do the central qualities 
“warm” and “cold” (Asch, 1946), the ethical qualities examined here are not core 
attributes of food for most people and likely matter more to a subset of consumers with 
relevant personal values.
(3) Values-based halos will emerge even when perceivers have ample information 
for forming a judgment. Past research on person perception halos finds that general 
impressions can color specific evaluations even when perceivers have access to ample 
independent information that directly bears on the judgment (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Similarly, might values-based health halos emerge even when perceivers are provided 
with objective nutritional information, such as the Nutrition Facts panel, which speaks 
directly to the focal judgment? Whereas dual-process models predict that objective 
information should attenuate these effects especially among those motivated to engage in 
deliberative processing, halo theory predicts that the same perceivers may overlook this 
objective information because the high personal relevance of the focal ethical quality 
leads them to engage in affect-based heuristic processing. 
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 (4) Specific healthy inferences arising from values-based claims will mediate  
downstream choice outcomes. In line with a situated cognition perspective on decision 
making (Smith & Semin, 2004; Schwarz, 2007), I predict that downstream decisions and 
choices will be influenced by the specific “healthy” or “unhealthy” inferences that are 
brought to mind in the immediate context (see 2 above). Given that decisions about how 
much to eat and whether or not to exercise are complex, with multiple inputs and 
competing considerations, the information that becomes activated in the immediate 
context—by the interaction between values-based claims and personal values—may 
disproportionately influence subsequent choice outcomes relevant to weight gain and 
obesity, presumably because it is deemed relevant because it came to mind (Higgins, 
1998). Of course, perceivers likely overlook the extent to which small situational 
manipulations (here, changing just a few words relevant to values) can dramatically shift 
their judgments and choices. Instead, they likely believe that their judgments and 
decisions are driven by objective nutritional profile of the food itself (see 3 above). 
14
Figure 1. The person values model depicting the hypothesized effect of values/ethics 
information on healthy/unhealthy inferences. 
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Chapter II
Health halos from eco-labeling: An “organic” claim reduces calorie judgments
Study 1
Method
As an initial test of the hypothesized effect of values-based claims on unwarranted 
health-related inferences, twenty-four students from the University of Michigan 
Introductory Psychology subject pool participated in a 30-minute laboratory session for 
which they received partial course credit. After providing consent, they first completed a 
series of paper-and-pencil tasks unrelated to the present hypothesis. Near the end of the 
30-minute session, they were randomly assigned to view one of two versions of a 
fictional food product description. In one condition, the product (“Aunt Martha’s 
Chocolate Chip Cookie”) was described as “organic” each time the product name 
appeared (i.e., 5 times) (n = 13); in the other condition, the description featured no such 
claim but was otherwise identical (n = 11) (see Appendix A for the complete text).
Participants were instructed to read the description carefully before completing 
the following measures intended to capture their judgment of calorie content (in order): 
1) How many calories would you guess are in a typical Aunt Martha’s [Organic]  
Chocolate Chip Cookie? (open-ended); 2) How do you think the calories in this Aunt  
Martha’s [Organic] Chocolate Chip Cookie compare to those of other brands of 
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chocolate chip cookies (assuming the same serving size)? (1 = Many fewer calories; 11 
= Many more calories). The task typically took approximately two minutes to complete.
Results and discussion
The open-ended and rating scale measures were z-scored and averaged to yield a 
standardized composite measure of relative calorie content. Consistent with expectations, 
the organic cookie was judged as significantly lower-calorie (Mz-score = -0.32) than was the 
conventional cookie (Mz-score = 0.38), t (22) = 2.26, p = .03. The unstandardized data 
revealed that the cookie was estimated to contain 20% fewer calories when it was 
described as “organic” than when it was not (Morganic = 195.38, SD = 87.33 vs. Mconventional = 
252.27, SD = 158.29)—a difference that was not statistically reliable on its own (t (22) = 
1.11, p = .27)—and that, relative to other brands, the cookie was rated as significantly 
lower-calorie when it was described as “organic” (Morganic = 6.31, SD = 1.25 vs. Mconventional 
= 7.55, SD = 1.13), t (22) = 2.53, p = .02. 
That the rating scale showed a significant effect while the open-ended estimates 
did not may seem somewhat surprising. However, it is well demonstrated that consumers 
typically lack an accurate awareness of absolute calorie content (Livingstone & Black, 
2003; Berman & Lavizzo-Mourey, 2008), and the greater variance associated with open-
ended estimates may make it difficult to detect effects. For these reasons, the following 




Instructions: Below is a picture and description of a food product. We are interested in 
your judgments about nutritional aspects of this food. Please read over the description 
provided and answer the questions appearing below. 
Name: Aunt Martha’s [Organic] Chocolate Chip Cookie
Origin: Bennington, Vermont
Description: Among the most popular of all cookies, the chocolate chip cookie is an 
American classic. Aunt Martha’s [Organic] Chocolate Chip Cookie, made by a small 
company noted for using the finest and freshest ingredients, has won a handful of 
regional competitions. Aunt Martha’s uses chunks of chocolate (in addition to chips), and 
are famous for their crisp outer layer and a soft middle, giving them a truly homemade 
taste. The average Aunt Martha’s [Organic] Chocolate Chip Cookie is approximately 4 to 
4.5 inches in diameter, which represents a typical “serving size.” 
-------
How many calories would you guess are in a typical Aunt Martha’s [Organic] Chocolate 
Chip Cookie?  
_________ calories
How do you think the calories in this Aunt Martha’s [Organic] Chocolate Chip Cookie 
compare to those of other brands of chocolate chip cookies (assuming the same serving 
size)? Please rate on the following scale, where 1 = many fewer calories than other 
brands, and 11 = many more calories than other brands (circle one)
1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7-------8--------9-------10--------11
Many fewer calories                Many more calories
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Chapter III
The moderating effect of personal values: Larger “organic” health halos among the 
highly pro-environmental
Results from Study 1 are consistent with the hypothesis that a values-based claim 
can activate health halos capable of reducing calorie judgments. However, Study 1 is 
limited in a number of ways. First, the lack of personal background variables made it 
impossible to test a key feature of the proposed model, namely, whether the magnitude of 
the effect varied across perceivers. Second, the featured product was fictional, and 
although participants were not explicitly told so, this raises the possibility that “organic” 
may bias calorie judgments when products are unfamiliar because consumers lack other 
information on which to base their judgment. If so, the generalizability of this effect 
would be quite limited. 
Study 2 was designed to address these limitations. First, various personal 
background variables were collected, including a common scale measure of pro-
environmentalism, the hypothesized moderator. Again, larger organic halos were 
expected among those scoring highly on this measure because their congruent personal 
values were expected to activate positive halos manifesting in the form of reduced calorie 
judgments (as depicted in Figure 1). Additionally, Study 2 featured organic and 
conventional versions of a real-world cookie brand, namely, conventional Oreos and 
Oreos “made with organic flour and sugar.” These products were marketed at the time of 
data collection and featured identical calorie content. Study 2 also tested for an effect on 
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downstream choice outcomes, namely, on judgments of how often the food should be 
eaten (i.e., a consumption recommendations). Finally, it examined whether calorie 
judgments mediated any effect of organic claim on consumption recommendations, in 




One hundred and fourteen students (80 females, 34 males) from the University of 
Michigan Introductory Psychology subject pool completed this laboratory experiment in 
exchange for partial course credit. As part of an approximately 30-minute session on 
“thinking about food,” participants provided consent and then completed a questionnaire 
soliciting personal background information including age, sex, political ideology, and the 
importance of eating healthfully. Participants also reported their height and weight, which 
were used to calculate body mass index (BMI) according to the current government 
guidelines (CDCP, 2010),2 found to moderate calorie judgments in previous research 
(Wansink & Chandon, 2006a, 2006b). 
Participants were then randomly assigned by computer algorithm to a web page 
displaying the actual Nutrition Facts panel for either conventional Oreos (n = 42) or for 
Oreos “made with organic flour and sugar” (n = 72) (Figure 2). Providing this objective 
nutritional information allowed for testing whether the hypothesized effects occurred 
despite participants having access to information that was directly relevant to their 
2 BMI was calculated according to the formula currently used by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention: weight (pounds) / height (inches)]2 x 703. 
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judgments. The Nutrition Facts indicated the same number of calories (i.e., 160 per 34g 
serving), and participants’ attention was drawn to this fact using the following 
instructions (underlines original): 
Below is a nutritional label from a package of Oreo cookies [Oreo cookies 
made with organic flour and sugar]. Notice that the serving size (34g) is 
equal to 2 cookies, which together contain 160 calories. Feel free to 
consult any of the nutritional information provided below before 
answering the questions. 
Beneath these instructions appeared the respective Nutrition Facts followed by a question 
capturing the calorie judgment (Compared to other cookie brands, do you think that 1 
serving of these [organic] Oreo cookies contains fewer calories or more calories?; 1 = 
Fewer calories, 7 = More calories) and a question capturing the consumption 
recommendation (Compared to other cookie brands, how often should these [organic]  
Oreo cookies be eaten?; 1 = Less often, 7 = More often).
Near the end of the session, all participants completed the 15-item New 
Ecological Paradigm scale (NEP; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000), a common 
measure of pro-environmentalism, which allowed for testing whether this variable 
interacted with organic claim as predicted. Sample items are “We are approaching the 
limit of the number of people the earth can support” and “Humans are severely abusing 
the environment.” 
Results
As predicted, participants’ judgments of calorie content relative to other brands 
were influenced by the organic claim. Even though all participants had just read that one 
serving of their randomly assigned product contained 160 calories, the cookies received 
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lower calorie judgments in the organic condition (M = 3.94) than in the conventional 
condition (M = 5.17); F (1, 112) = 26.17, p < .001, thus replicating the Study 1 finding 
with a real-world product. Furthermore, the organic claim influenced participants’ 
consumption recommendations: the cookies were deemed appropriate to eat more often 
when they were organic (M = 3.68) than when they were not (M = 2.76); F (1, 112) = 
22.39, p < .01.
Because attributes besides inferred calorie content may account for the effect of 
organic claim on consumption recommendations (e.g., lower levels of residual 
pesticides), I examined whether calorie judgments mediated this effect by testing the 
significance of pathway coefficients in the hypothesized mediation model (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986) (Figure 3). After confirming that both consumption recommendations and 
calorie judgments were significantly associated with the manipulation (see above), 
consumption recommendations were regressed onto condition (organic vs. conventional) 
and calorie judgments. Results revealed that calorie judgments significantly predicted 
consumption recommendations (b = –.54, |t| (111) = 5.35, p < .001) whereas condition no 
longer did so (b = –.26, |t| (111) = .91, p = .36), indicating that calorie judgments did 
indeed mediate the effect of condition on consumption recommendations (Sobel’s z = 
-3.69, p < .001).3 
Next, I examined whether these organic halos were more pronounced for highly 
pro-environmental participants, as halo logic suggests. To test this, calorie judgments 
were first regressed onto condition (organic = –0.5, conventional = +0.5), pro-
environmentalism (NEP score, mean-centered), and their interaction term. Results 
3 These mediation results are interpreted with some caution, however, given that both calorie judgments 
and consumption recommendations may merely reflect the same underlying variable (e.g., the healthiness 
associated with organic foods).
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revealed a significant interaction (b = .06, t (110) = 1.95, p = .05) such that the effect of 
organic claim on calorie judgments was larger at higher levels of pro-environmentalism 
(Figure 4).4 Whereas the main effect of condition on calorie judgments again emerged (b 
= –1.22, |t| (110) = 5.09, p < .001), there was no main effect of pro-environmentalism (b 
= –.01, |t| < 1, ns). A similar analysis was conducted for consumption recommendations. 
The interaction between pro-environmentalism and condition did not emerge for 
consumption recommendations (b = –.04, |t| < 1, ns). The main effect of condition on 
consumption recommendations again emerged (b = –.89, |t| (110) = 3.09, p < .01), and 
there was no main effect of pro-environmentalism (b = .02, t < 1, ns). Finally, age, sex, 
BMI, importance of eating healthfully, and political ideology did not significantly 
moderate any of the effects (ps > .20). 
Discussion
Together, Studies 1 and 2 extend the literature on health halos from relative 
nutrition claims (Andrews et al., 1998; Kozup, Creyer, & Burton, 2003; Wansink & 
Chandon, 2006a) by demonstrating that “organic,” a production-related claim that is 
silent on nutrient content, can nevertheless elicit unwarranted nutritional inferences, here 
in form of reduced calorie estimates. When judging the calorie content of Oreo cookies 
relative to other brands, participants evaluating Oreo cookies “made with organic flour 
4 Further diagnosis of this interaction with spotlight and simple slopes analysis following Aiken & West 
(1991) confirmed that the pattern is consistent with halo logic. The calorie judgments of participants at high 
levels of pro-environmentalism (M+1SD) showed a pronounced effect of organic claim (Morganic = 3.69 vs. 
Mconventional = 5.37; b = 1.68, t (110) = 4.90, p < .001), whereas a weaker but still significant effect emerged 
among participants at low levels of pro-environmentalism  (M-1SD) (Morganic = 4.23 vs. Mconventional = 5.04; t 
(110) = 2.36, p = .02). Moreover, the association between calorie judgments and pro-environmentalism was 
nearly significant in the organic condition only (borganic = -.04, |t| (110) = 1.79, p = .08 vs. bconventional = .02, |t| 
< 1, ns). 
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and sugar” provided lower calorie judgments than did participants evaluating 
conventional Oreos. This effect was observed even though participants’ attention had just 
been drawn to the Nutrition Facts label that accurately conveyed that one serving of their 
randomly assigned cookie (organic or conventional) contained 160 calories. In addition, 
participants considered it appropriate to consume the cookies more frequently when they 
were “organic,” an effect that was mediated by perceived calorie content. Finally, 
consistent with halo logic, the observed bias in calorie judgments was more pronounced 
among people scoring highly on an individual difference measure of pro-
environmentalism, or those with claim-congruent values who likely feel positively 
toward the claim in the first place.
That the organic claim reduced calorie judgments in the face of objective calorie 
information suggests the use of the attribute “organic” as a heuristic cue (Batte, Hooker, 
Haab, & Beaverson, 2007) that guides calorie judgments. As mentioned above, calorie 
estimation is a cognitively demanding task and prone to numerous biases and situational 
influences (e.g., Livingstone & Black, 2003; see Wansink, 2004 for a discussion). If 
people are poor judges of calorie content, they may use organic claims as a basis for 
classifying foods as “good” or “natural,” a heuristic that simplifies nutrition information 
and may reduce calorie judgments (for a discussion, see Rozin, Ashmore, & Markwith, 
1996; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Interestingly, while most models of judgment 
predict that this “organic” = “healthy” heuristic would operate among those who are less 
equipped to provide an accurate judgment (e.g., those unfamiliar with “organic”), the fact 
that pro-environmentalists showed the largest organic halos suggests that those who were 
better able to accurately judge the stimuli through deliberative processing nevertheless 
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showed heuristic biases. This paradoxical effect may occur in domains in which positive 
affect and knowledge are highly correlated, presumably resulting from self-selection into 
valued domains and the resulting gains in objective knowledge from differential 
information exposure (e.g., Moorman, Diehl, Brinberg, & Kidwell, 2004). However, 
because it can be argued that the current study assessed self-identification (i.e., as pro-
environmental) as opposed to domain knowledge (i.e., accurate understanding of the 
meaning of “organic”), further research should assess objective knowledge in order to 
establish whether affect-based heuristic processes trump knowledge-based deliberative 
processes in identity-relevant judgments. I return to this point in the general discussion.
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Figure 2. Nutrition Facts panels for Oreo cookies “made with organic flour and sugar” 
and conventional Oreo cookies (“organic” label at left).
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Figure 3. Mediating role of calorie judgments in the effect of values-based claim 
(“organic” vs. conventional) on consumption recommendations.
27
N = 114; **p < .001; *p < .01
 
Calorie judgment
             Values-based claim 
(–0.5 = “organic”; +0.5 = conventional)
  Consumption 
recommendation
b = –.54**b = 1.22**
b = –.92*; b = –.26
Figure 4. Interaction between values-based claim (“organic” vs. conventional) and pro-
environmentalism for calorie judgments (Low = M-1SD; High = M+1SD). 
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Chapter IV
Health halos from social-ethics labeling: “Fair-trade” chocolate is judged to contain 
fewer calories
The first two studies suggest that a common values-based claim conveying pro-
environmental ethics (i.e., the eco-label “organic”) carries a health halo capable of 
influencing calorie judgments and consumption recommendations. Study 3 sought to 
examine whether ethical claims from beyond the environmental domain can elicit similar 
effects. 
Analogous to Study 1, which featured an “organic” claim on a fictional cookie 
product, Study 3 examined the effect of a “fair trade” claim on calorie judgments of a 
fictional brand of chocolate. From an associative network perspective (Collins & Loftus, 
1975), “fair trade” might be considered even less likely than “organic” to influence 
nutrient-related judgments such as calorie estimates because it speaks primarily to social 
aspects of food production and distribution rather than to any inherent quality of the food 
itself. Nevertheless, consumers might infer that fair trade chocolate has fewer calories for 
the reasons outlined in the introduction. If so, it would provide additional evidence for 
values-based halo effects, given that large conceptual distance between the halo source 
(i.e., “fair trade”) and specific evaluation dimensions (i.e., calorie content) bolsters the 
case for a true halo effect as opposed to an effect reflecting deliberate (though flawed) 




Fifty-six online participants (37 females, 19 males) were recruited via 
Amazon.com’s crowd-sourcing website, Mechanical Turk, to complete a brief (1- to 2-
minute) questionnaire on “judgments about food” in exchange for a nominal fee ($0.05) 
(see Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010, for a validation of Mechanical Turk as a data 
source). Participants provided consent and were randomly assigned by computer 
algorithm to read a brief (one-paragraph) description of a fictional brand of chocolate 
(“Petersen’s”) that was either described as “fair-trade” (n = 27) or not (n = 29). In the fair 
trade condition, the claim appeared directly before the brand name each time it appeared 
(i.e., 3 times). Out of concern that some participants would be unfamiliar with the claim’s 
meaning, the fair trade description further elaborated: “Petersen's pays its cocoa farmers 
50% more than the standard market price for cocoa, to ensure that the farmers receive a 
fair wage for their efforts.” Otherwise, the two descriptions were identical (see Appendix 
B for the complete text). 
Participants then judged the calorie content of their randomly assigned chocolate 
relative to other brands (underlining original): Compared to other brands of chocolate,  
how many calories do you think that one serving of Petersen’s [fair-trade] chocolate  
contains? (1 = Many fewer calories; 7 = Many more calories). Finally, participants 
reported on various personal background characteristics including age, gender, 
educational attainment, and political affiliation (Democrat, Republican, Independent, or 
Other/None of the above). Mean age was 38.2 years (SD = 14.2 years), and participants 
were diverse educationally (11% high school graduates, 27% with some college, 46% 
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college graduates, 16% post-graduate studies) as well as politically (34% Democrat, 20% 
Republican, 36% Independent, 11% Other). 
Results and discussion
Consistent with expectations, the featured chocolate was judged as significantly 
lower-calorie when it was described as fair trade (M = 4.30, SD = .78) than when it was 
not (M = 4.76, SD = .74), F (1, 56) = 5.22, p = .03. No personal background variable 
significantly moderated the effect (ts < 1.81, ns). 
The present findings build on Studies 1 and 2 by demonstrating that in addition to 
the eco-label “organic,” a claim primarily about social ethics can bias calorie judgments 
as well: web participants judged a fictional brand of chocolate as significantly lower-
calorie when it was labeled “fair-trade” than when it was not. By featuring an older and 
more diverse participant pool (educationally and politically) compared to Studies 1 and 2, 
this study also suggests that values-based health halos are not restricted to young people 
at a predominately liberal university who might be more familiar with and thus feel more 
positively toward ethical food claims. 
This halo interpretation is made with some caution, however, given that other 
processes might have contributed to the present effect. For instance, “fair-trade” may 
have decreased calorie judgments simply because the mere presence of an advertising 
claim might be construed as a persuasive appeal relevant to the focal judgment (Wänke & 
Reutner, 2010). This concern is attenuated, however, given that the term was explicitly 
defined in the fair trade condition, which should have made salient the claim’s 
irrelevance to the focal judgment. Another possibility is that generic positive associations 
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of the word “fair” may have fostered the positive inferences observed here, bypassing 
ethics-based inferences entirely. Thus, more compelling evidence for an ethical halo 
effect would come from demonstrating that 1) social ethics halos are larger among 
perceivers who especially value food produced by socially ethical means and that 2) these 
halos occur in the absence of any advertising claim (including the absence of the word 
“fair”) that could be construed as a persuasive appeal. 
Study 4 sought to address these alternative explanations by testing whether 
learning that a food was produced in socially ethical (vs. unethical) ways can reduce 
calorie judgments and whether this effect is larger among perceivers who especially value 
socially ethical food production.5
5 Beyond the mere claim explanation, it remains possible that participants judged “organic” and “fair trade” 
products as lower-calorie because they are aware of the research hypothesis and cooperate accordingly. 
However, when asked to comment on the tasks, no participant accurately volunteered the hypothesis in any 
of the studies reported here. 
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Appendix B
“Fair trade” chocolate description
Instructions: Below you will see a picture and brief description of a food product. Simply 
read the information carefully and answer the question that follows.
Product name: Petersen's [fair-trade*] chocolate
Description: Petersen's [fair-trade] chocolate is a deliciously smooth chocolate from 
Petersen's: a small chocolate company known for high quality. The secret is in the 
making: this chocolate is created by hand in small batches, and each batch is thoroughly 
tested to ensure its quality. 
[*Petersen's pays its cocoa farmers 50% more than the standard market price for cocoa, to 
ensure that the farmers receive a fair wage for their efforts.]
-------
Now, please answer the following question (please do not consult any sources 
whatsoever; we are interested only in your best guess):
Compared to other brands of chocolate, how many calories do you think that one serving 
of Petersen's [fair-trade] chocolate contains (1 = Many fewer calories; 7 = Many more 
calories)?
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6------------7
Many fewer calories            Many more calories
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Chapter V
Beyond advertising claims: Health halos from socially ethical versus unethical food 
production methods
As a conceptual replication of the “fair trade” halo found in Study 3, I sought to 
test whether simply learning that a food was produced by socially ethical versus unethical 
means could evoke health halos, and whether these halos depended on the personal 
values of perceivers. Moreover, moving beyond advertising claims allowed for testing 
whether negative production information (i.e., socially unethical production practices) 




One hundred and ninety-two students (125 females, 61 males, 6 did not report 
sex) from the University of Michigan Introductory Psychology subject pool completed 
this approximately 30-minute laboratory experiment on “thinking about food” in 
exchange for partial course credit. 
Similar to the procedure from Study 3, participants provided consent and were 
randomly assigned by computer algorithm to read one of three brief descriptions of a 
fictional brand of chocolate called “Petersen’s.” In all conditions, participants read the 
same standard description of the product. The description was ostensibly taken from an 
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article appearing in a food magazine that was written by a journalist who was unaffiliated 
with the Petersen company. The purpose of including this information was to reduce the 
possibility that participants would construe the product description as an implicit 
persuasive appeal on the part of the company. 
In addition to the standard product description, participants in the ethical 
condition read an additional paragraph detailing the company’s socially ethical treatment 
of its cocoa suppliers in West Africa (e.g., “the company offers excellent wages and 
health care” and “donates far more to local charities than do other companies”) (see 
Appendix C for the complete text) (n = 64). In the unethical condition, participants 
instead read an additional paragraph describing the company’s socially unethical 
practices that differed only slightly from the wording of the ethical condition (e.g., “the 
company offers poor wages and no health care” and “donates far less to local charities 
than do other companies”) (italics added here for emphasis) (n = 64). In the control 
condition, participants read only the standard description of the product (n = 64).6
Participants then completed the main dependent variables. In addition to 
providing a calorie judgment and consumption recommendation as did participants in 
Study 2, they estimated the likelihood that consuming this chocolate would contribute to 
chronic illness (disease-risk perception), a variable investigated in prior research on halo 
effects from food labeling (e.g., Garretson & Burton, 2000; Kozup et al., 2003), which 
allowed for testing whether ethics information can influence judgments about longer-term 
health outcomes: Compared to other brands of chocolate, how likely do you think it is  
6 Two other conditions were originally included in this study: a “fair trade” condition and a “new and 
improved” condition, in which participants read the standard product description with the respective 
advertising claim appearing before the brand name each time it appeared. The latter claim was intended to 
control for the effect of a positively valenced but ethics-irrelevant claim. However, most participants (> 
60%) later indicated being unfamiliar with the meaning of “fair trade,” and so these conditions were 
dropped from the analyses.
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that eating Petersen's chocolate regularly would put a person at risk for chronic 
illnesses, such as heart disease and diabetes? (1 = Less likely; 7 = More likely). 
Afterwards, participants completed the individual difference measures. To assess 
ethical food values, participants completed the 11-item Ethical Food Choice 
questionnaire (EFC; Lindeman & Vänäänen, 2000), which includes items that tap 
equitable social relations and which was selected for its high face validity, an example 
item being: It is important that the food I eat on a typical day comes from a country in 
which human rights are not violated (1 = Not at all important; 4 = Very important).7 As 
in Study 2, participants also completed the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) to measure 
pro-environmentalism, which was not expected to significantly interact with condition 
(i.e., ethical vs. unethical information) in the present study. In contrast, this measure was 
included here in order to demonstrate that the emergence of ethical halos depends on a 
close fit between personal values and the focal values/ethics quality (here, ethical food 
concerns and socially ethical versus unethical production). Participants also completed an 
adapted version of the General Nutrition Knowledge questionnaire (GNK) (Drichoutis, 
Lazaridis, & Nayga, 2005) to control for basic nutrition knowledge (see Appendix D for 
the complete text). Finally, participants provided personal background information, 
including age, sex, as well as height and weight (to calculate BMI as in Study 2).
7 Although the Ethical Food Choice questionnaire offers high face validity, choosing one individual 
difference measure over others can be problematic when predicting moderation effects. Out of this concern, 
another measure was included, namely, the Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) because it taps the opposite side of Schwartz’s (1992) self-transcendence/self-
enhancement dimension (i.e., authority and wealth, as opposed to social justice and egalitarianism). While 
not reported in detail here, EFC and SDO were negatively correlated (r = -.26, p < .001) and remained so 
when controlling for political conservatism (significantly associated with SDO score only; r = .36, p < .
001). Although SDO did not moderate any condition effect, it was negatively and significantly associated 
with calorie judgments in the unethical condition, consistent with halo logic (t (185) = -1.99, p < .05). 
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Results 
Below, I report the results for each of the three dependent variables in turn (i.e., 
calorie judgments, consumption recommendations, disease-risk perceptions). As 
expected, pro-environmentalism (i.e., NEP score) did not interact with condition for any 
of these variables (|t|s < 1, ns) and is not discussed further.
Calorie judgments. As expected, participants in the ethical information condition 
provided lower calorie judgments (M = 4.76, SD = 1.20) than did participants in the 
unethical (M = 4.87, SD = 1.11) and control conditions (M = 4.92, SD = 1.14). However, 
a one-way ANOVA testing for the effect of condition on calorie judgment—controlling 
for covariates (i.e., nutrition knowledge, sex, and BMI)—was not significant (F < 1, ns), 
nor was the pair-wise contrast comparing the unethical and ethical means (t < 1, ns).
Recall that the effect of ethical information on calorie judgments was expected to 
vary as a function of perceivers’ ethical food values as assessed by the EFC scale. To test 
this, calorie judgments were regressed onto condition (dummy-coded), ethical food 
values (EFC scores, mean-centered), their interaction terms, and covariates (i.e., nutrition 
knowledge, sex, and BMI).8 These analyses revealed significant interactions between 
experimental condition and ethical food values,9 such that the ethical chocolate was 
judged as significantly lower-calorie (M = 4.53) than the unethical chocolate (M = 5.17) 
among participants reporting high ethical food values (i.e., at M+1SD) (|t|(177) = 2.30, p 
8 The three-level condition variable necessitated a series of multiple regressions. In the first regression, 
Ethical Food Choice scores were mean-centered prior to constructing the interaction terms, and dummy 
codes were entered for the ethical and control conditions (the unethical condition served as the reference 
group) which enabled testing the simple slope in the unethical condition. A similar regression was 
conducted treating the ethical condition as the reference group. Following Aiken & West (1991), spotlight 
analyses were then repeated at M+1SD and M-1SD, with ethical food values (i.e., EFC scores) centered 
accordingly. 
9 Ethical food values (i.e., EFC scores) significantly interacted with condition in two out of three 
interaction terms: unethical vs. ethical (|t| (177) = 2.65, p < .01); unethical vs. control (|t| (177) = 2.06, p = .
04); ethical vs. control (|t| < 1, ns). 
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= .04), as halo logic would predict (Figure 5). Calorie judgments in the control condition 
fell in-between (M = 4.88) and did not differ from either of the other conditions (|t|s < 
1.30, ns). The condition means did not differ significantly among participants reporting 
low ethical food values (i.e., at M-1SD) (Methical = 5.02 Munethical = 4.59, Mcontrol = 5.08) (|t|s 
< 1.62, ns).
Simple slopes analysis examined whether these interactions were driven by 
ratings of ethical chocolate, unethical chocolate, or both. Calorie judgments showed a 
marginally significant and negative association with ethical food values in the ethical 
condition (b = -.02, t (177) = -1.63, p = .10) and a significant and positive association 
with ethical food values in the unethical condition (b  = .03, t (177) = 2.08, p = .04). In 
other words, as ethical food values increased, the chocolate was judged as lower-calorie 
when it was produced ethically but as higher-calorie when it was produced unethically. 
Consumption recommendations. Not surprisingly, an ANOVA model revealed 
that consumption recommendations were higher in the ethical (M = 4.53, SD = 1.45) than 
in the unethical condition (M = 2.41, SD = 1.39) (95% CI: 1.63 to 2.62, p < .001); the 
control condition fell in between (M = 3.92, SD = 1.40) and differed from both the ethical 
and unethical condition (95% CIs: -1.21 to .00, p < .05, and .91 to 2.12, p < .001, 
respectively) (F (2, 180) = 36.95, p < .001, controlling for covariates). Recall that this 
effect was expected to be larger among individuals with strong ethical food values, an 
interaction effect that was expected to be partially driven by calorie judgments. In other 
words, mediated moderation was expected (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005).
To test these predictions, consumption recommendations were first regressed onto 
condition (dummy-coded), ethical food values (EFC scores, mean-centered), and their 
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interaction terms. As expected, the interactions between the condition dummies and 
ethical food values were significant (ts > 2.37, ps < .05), such that among participants 
reporting high ethical food values (i.e., at M+1SD), the chocolate received significantly 
lower consumption recommendations in the unethical condition (M = 1.82) than in the 
ethical (M = 4.53) and control conditions (M = 4.09) (ts > 6.37, ps < .001); the latter two 
conditions did not differ (|t|(177) = 1.28, ns). These differences also emerged but were 
less pronounced among participants reporting low ethical food values (i.e., at M-1SD) 
(Munethical = 2.68 versus Methical = 4.18 and Mcontrol = 3.85) (ts > 2.38, ps < .02); the ethical 
versus control difference was marginally significant, t (177) = 1.92, p = .06. As it was for 
calorie judgments, consumption recommendations were significantly associated with 
ethical food values in the unethical condition only (b = -.04, t (177) = -2.40, p = .02).
Next, analyses tested whether calorie judgments mediated this interaction effect. 
Following the steps prescribed by Muller et al. (2005) for testing mediated moderation, 
the moderation effect was shown to be significant in both the consumption 
recommendation and calorie judgment regressions (described above). Next, a regression 
tested whether the moderation effect on consumption recommendations was attenuated 
when controlling for the hypothesized mediator (j.e., calorie judgment) and its 
moderation term (i.e., calorie judgment*ethical food values). Results revealed a 
significant effect of calorie judgment (t (175) = -3.76, p < .001) and a reduced 
moderation effect on consumption recommendations;10 thus, it appears that the greater 
consumption recommendations provided by participants with strong ethical food values 
for the ethical chocolate were at least partly driven by calorie judgments, consistent with 
10 Treating the unethical condition as the reference group, the ethical food values*ethical dummy 
interaction was reduced to non-significance, t (175) = 1.73, p = .09. The ethical food values*control 
dummy interaction was also attenuated but remained significant, t (175) = 2.48, p = .01.
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the situated cognition framework advanced here.
Disease-risk perceptions. An ANOVA model testing for the effect of condition on 
disease-risk perception revealed that the ethical chocolate was judged as less likely to 
contribute to chronic disease (M = 3.44, SD = 1.48) than was the unethical chocolate (M 
= 4.14, SD = 1.22) (95% CI: -1.30 to -.11, p = .01) and marginally less likely than was 
the control chocolate (M = 4.00, SD = 1.46) (95% CI: -1.16 to .03, p = .07); the latter two 
conditions did not differ (95% CI: -.45 to .73, ns) (Bonferroni corrections for multiple 
comparisons) (F (2, 180) = 3.36, p < .05, controlling for covariates). However, when 
disease-risk estimates were regressed onto condition (dummy-coded), ethical food values 
(EFC scores, mean-centered), and their interaction terms (including covariates), only the 
effects of the condition dummies emerged (ts > 1.96, ps ≤ .05)—none of the interaction 
terms was significant (|t|s < 1.32, ns).11
Discussion
The present results extend those from Studies 1 through 3 in various ways. First, 
they provide a conceptual replication of the moderation effect found in Study 2, in that 
ethical health halos again depended on perceivers’ personal values. Second, they 
demonstrate that values-based halos can emerge in the absence of an explicit advertising 
claim such as “fair trade,” which argues against implicit persuasive appeals (Wänke & 
Reutner, 2010) or positive associations of the word “fair” as alternative explanations for 
this effect. Third, these results demonstrate that negative information about a company’s 
actions can lead perceivers to judge products as less healthy (i.e., higher-calorie), thus 
demonstrating negative health halos. That perceptions of the unethical chocolate 
11 The ethical condition was treated as the reference group.
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appeared to drive these effects is consistent with social cognition research showing more 
powerful effects of negative versus positive information on judgments (Kunda, 1999). 
In contrast to the main effect of “organic” on calorie judgments in Study 2, the 
present results showed only the interaction effect between condition (i.e., ethical versus 
unethical production methods) and personal values (i.e., scores on the Ethical Food 
Choice questionnaire). Both results are consistent with the halo-based conceptual model. 
The person values model predicts larger halos among perceivers who feel strongly toward 
the focal values/ethics information and makes no main effect prediction per se. However, 
it is not surprising that organic claims in Study 2 showed a main effect in addition to the 
predicted interaction, given the popularity of that claim and its “healthy” associations for 
most Americans. 
The effects on consumption recommendations were also consistent with the 
person values model. While the main effect of ethical versus unethical information on 
consumption recommendations is of little theoretical interest, the fact that individuals 
high on ethical food values gave especially low consumption recommendations for the 
unethical chocolate relative to the ethical chocolate is consistent with halo logic. Because 
socially unethical production is sharply incongruent with the values of these individuals, 
this information presumably evoked a strong negative impression that manifested as the 
unhealthy inferences seen here. While this interaction effect on consumption 
recommendation may be driven by any number of associations, the fact that it was 
attenuated when calorie judgments were controlled for provides further support for the 
person values model. More broadly, this pattern is consistent with situated cognition 
research emphasizing how information that is activated and applicable in the immediate 
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context can powerfully affect the judgments and decisions at hand (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 
1979; Smith & Semin, 2004; Schwarz, 2007).
The present study also shows that chocolate is perceived as less disease-
promoting when it is produced by socially ethical means. Interestingly, this effect was not 
moderated by personal values (toward ethical food values), in contrast to the other 
findings reported here. While speculative, this pattern may reflect a general belief that 
socially ethical companies are more trustworthy and thus less likely to allow illness-
causing substances into their products. However, this explanation seems unlikely given 
that the disease-risk question specifically referred to common consumption-related 
illnesses (i.e., diabetes and heart-disease), not to diseases that are typically associated 
with harmful non-food substances (e.g., cancer), and that risk perception was lower in the 
ethical condition compared to both the unethical and control conditions, suggesting that 
participants saw the ethical chocolate as less risky and not the unethical chocolate as 
more so. Second, unlike calorie judgments and consumption recommendations, the risk 
of disease from regularly consuming indulgent foods like chocolate may be widely 
accepted and relatively fixed. Thus, it is possible that the halo shown for ethical chocolate 
instead reflects the activation of healthy concepts raised by the ethical chocolate 
description (which described the high quality health care provided to the company’s 
workers), whereas chocolate may carry strong unhealthy/bad associations otherwise 
(Rozin et al., 1996).
Taken together, Studies 1 through 4 provide the first empirical evidence that 
ethics-related production qualities can bias health-related inferences, with Studies 1 and 2 
demonstrating unwarranted inferences from “organic” labeling and Studies 3 and 4 
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demonstrating parallel effects for socially ethical production (“fair trade”, favorable 
worker treatment). While these studies demonstrate effects on judgments of the food 
itself, whether values/ethics information can bias other health-related choice outcomes 
(e.g., exercise decisions, caloric intake) remains an open question. Study 5 was intended 
as a first step in this direction, by examining whether a values-based claim can influence 
perceivers’ decisions about the importance of physical exercise, an important factor in 
obesity.
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Figure 5. Interaction between social ethics information (ethical vs. unethical production) 
and ethical food values for calorie judgments (Low = M-1SD; High = M+1SD).
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Appendix C
Socially ethical and unethical chocolate descriptions
Instructions: Below, you will see some information about a product and the company that 
produces it. Then, you will be asked some questions. 
Note that the description is an excerpt from Food & Culture magazine. It was written by a 
journalist who is unaffiliated with the featured company. 
Please read all of the information carefully before answering the questions that follow.
Product name: Petersen's chocolate
Description: Petersen's chocolate comes from a small company known for producing a 
high-quality, deliciously smooth chocolate bar. The secret is in the making: this chocolate 
is created by hand in small batches, and each batch is thoroughly tested to ensure superior 
quality. The Petersen Company has won numerous awards for the excellent taste of its 
chocolate.
[Ethical information condition; italics added here for emphasis]
The Petersen Company is also known for its ethical business practices. For instance, 
the company offers excellent wages and health care to workers on its West Africa 
cocoa farms. Also, the company donates far more to local charities than do other 
companies, and as a direct result, schools in the surrounding villages offer the highest  
quality education in the area. Petersen has also strongly supported efforts to end 
forced child labor on cocoa farms, a shameful practice that treats young people much 
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like slaves. Strongly praised by human rights groups, Petersen has built a reputation 
as an ethical chocolate maker.
[Unethical information condition; italics added here for emphasis] 
The Petersen Company is also known for its unethical business practices. For 
instance, the company offers poor wages and no health care to workers on its West 
Africa cocoa farms. Also, the company donates far less to local charities than do other 
companies, and as a direct result, schools in the surrounding villages offer the lowest  
quality education in the area. Petersen has also strongly opposed efforts to end forced 
child labor on cocoa farms, a shameful practice that treats young people much like 
slaves. Strongly criticized by human rights groups, Petersen has a built a reputation as 




Instructions: Below are some questions related to nutrition. Please answer each to the best 
of your knowledge (for all comparisons, assume an equal serving size).
For each of the following pair of foods, please select the food that contains more 
calories.
1. peas or peanuts __ peas __ peanuts
2. coconut milk or chicken broth __ coconut milk __ chicken broth
For each of the following pairs of foods, please select the food that contains more 
cholesterol.
1. butter or margarine __ butter __ margarine
2. egg yolks or egg whites __ egg yolks __ egg whites
For each of the following pair of foods, please select the food that contains more fat.
1. sour cream or yogurt __ sour cream __ yogurt
2. roast chicken or boiled chicken __ roast chicken __ boiled chicken
12 This measure was adapted from the General Nutrition Knowledge questionnaire (GNK; Drichoutis et al., 
2005) and taps the same content areas as the original measure (i.e., calories, cholesterol, and fat). The 
cholesterol and fat questions are from the original; the calorie questions were used in place of questions 
about recommended daily intake of fat and sodium but matched those questions in form. Scores are the 




Effects on downstream choice outcomes: Can “organic” claims undermine the perceived 
importance of exercise?
If organic foods are assumed to contain fewer calories (Studies 1 and 2), then 
eating organic foods might be seen as a suitable substitute for other weight-loss 
promoting behaviors, including exercise—an important factor in obesity. Research on 
goal cognition suggests that this is plausible. Perceived progress toward a weight-loss 
goal has been shown to reduce the likelihood of subsequent goal-consistent choice, such 
as choosing an apple over a chocolate bar (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). To the extent that the 
act of eating organic foods is construed as progress toward a weight-loss goal, it might 
relax judgments about the importance of physical exercise, suggesting that values-based 
claims can undermine healthy choices.
Study 5
Method
As part of a 30-minute session on “thinking about food,” two hundred and fifteen 
students (117 females, 98 males) from the University of Michigan Introductory 
Psychology subject pool participated in this laboratory experiment in exchange for partial 
course credit. Data from one participant were excluded due to a computer glitch, leaving 
N = 214 for analysis. Participants provided consent and then completed the same personal 
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background questionnaire from Study 2; afterwards, they were instructed to read about a 
person facing a choice and to indicate the decision they thought was best.
Participants read about a target person, Susie, described as a 20-year-old sorority 
member with a weight-loss goal. Participants read that Susie typically runs three miles 
after dinner but that today she was considering forgoing exercise to spend more time on 
schoolwork. Susie ate “roasted vegetables over brown rice” for dinner; the experimental 
manipulation was applied to her dessert choice, which was between “a small bowl of ice 
cream” and “a chocolate chip cookie,” only one of which was described as “organic.” 
Participants were randomly assigned by computer algorithm to one of five conditions: 
organic ice cream (n = 41), organic cookie (n = 50), conventional ice cream (n = 41), 
conventional cookie (n = 47), or a no-dessert control condition (n = 35).13 Susie either 
chose the organic dessert, the non-organic dessert, or “no dessert at all” (neither dessert 
was described as “organic” in the control condition) (see Appendix E for the complete 
text). 
Participants then answered the following question to capture leniency toward 
forgoing exercise: Under the circumstances, do you think it would be okay for Susie to 
skip her usual 3-mile run tonight? (1 = Not at all okay; 7 = Very okay). Participants in 
the organic conditions were expected to judge exercise as less important (i.e., show 
greater leniency toward forgoing exercise) than were participants in the conventional 
conditions. Finally, participants completed the New Ecological Paradigm scale as in 
previous studies, which allowed for testing whether the predicted effect varied by pro-
environmentalism.
13 Assigning more participants to the organic and conventional conditions than to the control condition 
afforded greater N for testing the primary hypothesis and helped ensure that any observed effect was not 
attributable to a particular food (i.e., cookie or ice cream).
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Results
Because there were no hypotheses regarding specific dessert food (i.e., cookie vs. 
ice cream), this variable was collapsed after confirming that it did not interact with food 
claim (i.e., organic vs. conventional) (F < 1, ns).
Given the primary hypothesis that the target (Susie) would receive higher 
leniency ratings when she chose organic over conventional dessert, relative to the reverse, 
I tested the corresponding planned contrast in ANOVA (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985).14 
As predicted, participants were significantly more lenient toward Susie forgoing exercise 
when she had chosen an organic dessert (M = 5.42, SD = 1.44) rather than a conventional 
dessert (M = 4.99; SD = 1.52) (F (1, 211) = 3.80, p = .05) (Figure 6). Participants’ 
leniency in the no-dessert control condition fell in-between (M = 5.37, SD = 1.44); 
although it was higher than when Susie chose a conventional dessert, this difference was 
not significant (F (1, 211) = 1.69, ns). 
Given that pro-environmentalism moderated the effect of organic claim on calorie 
judgments in Study 2, I tested whether highly pro-environmental participants were 
especially lenient toward Susie forgoing exercise when she chose organic dessert. Pro-
environmentalism (i.e., NEP score) did not moderate the present effect (t < 1, ns). 
However, closer examination revealed that pro-environmentalism was significantly 
associated with leniency in the organic condition only (r = 0.22, p < .04).15 In other 
words, when the target person chose “organic” dessert, perceivers higher on pro-
environmentalism tended to be more lenient toward her forgoing exercise, consistent with 
14 Contrast weights: +1 (organic mean), –1 (conventional mean), 0 (no-dessert control mean). 
15 Simple slopes analysis corroborated this pattern. When leniency judgments were regressed onto 
condition (dummy-coded), NEP, and the interaction terms (treating the organic condition as the reference 
group), the association between leniency and NEP approached significance in the organic condition only, b 
= .20, t (208) = 1.60, p = .11.
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halo logic. Finally, BMI, sex, importance of eating healthfully, and political ideology did 
not moderate the present effect (ts < 1.6, ns). 
Discussion
These results demonstrate that the effect of values-based claims can extend 
beyond judgments of the food itself to influence downstream judgments about the need 
for physical exercise. Despite Susie’s goal of losing weight through regular exercise, 
participants were more lenient toward her forgoing planned exercise when she had just 
chosen organic over conventional dessert. As millions of Americans attempt to lose 
weight, eating organic foods—even desserts—might problematically be viewed as a 
substitute for behaviors that actually promote weight loss, such as regular exercise.
Although leniency was higher in the no-dessert (control) condition than in the 
conventional dessert condition, it is somewhat surprising that the observed difference was 
not significant. This may be partly due to having fewer participants in the control 
condition, a result of intentionally assigning more participants to the organic and 
convention dessert conditions on which the primary hypothesis was focused. Even more 
surprising may be the similar leniency ratings observed in the organic and no-dessert 
conditions—in fact, leniency toward forgoing exercise was slightly greater when Susie 
chose organic dessert than when she chose to eat no dessert at all, suggesting that the 
organic halo may be strong enough to offset the indulgent associations characteristic of 
dessert in general. 
Finally, it is somewhat surprising that pro-environmentalism did not significantly 
moderate the effect of organic claim on leniency toward forgoing exercise, although a 
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significant correlation between pro-environmentalism and leniency did emerge in the 
organic condition, consistent with halo logic. This weaker moderation effect may result 
from leniency judgments being mediated by processes unrelated to calorie inferences. For 
instance, Mazar and Zhong (2010) observed that green consumption has a moral 
licensing effect, allowing people to behave more unethically after consuming 
environmentally friendly products. If eating organic dessert is construed as an ethical act, 
observers may be more tolerant when the person subsequently “cheats” on a weight-loss 
goal by forgoing exercise, given the credentials already earned. Another possibility is that 
perceivers might have different naïve theories about the kinds of people who choose 
organic over conventional options. Perceivers might show more leniency toward targets 
who choose organic because they are seen as people who typically make healthy choices 
(e.g., likely to exercise in the near future). This possibility seems somewhat unlikely, 
however, given that the target was described identically and as trying to lose weight 
through diet and regular exercise in all conditions.
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Figure 6. Mean leniency toward the target forgoing exercise by dessert condition (error 




Name: Susie Thompson (college student, age 20)
Susie is member of Kappa Alpha Omega sorority at West Virginia University. 
She is currently trying to lose weight by eating healthy meals and getting regular 
exercise. For example, last night Susie had a spinach salad topped with chicken 
and walnuts for dinner, a small piece of cake for dessert. She then went on her 
usual 3-mile run. 
Tonight, Susie has lots of homework to do and so she is a bit busier than normal. 
She has just finished dinner and dessert, and is trying to decide whether or not to 
skip her usual run in order to save time. For dinner, she had roasted vegetables 
over brown rice. For dessert, she was deciding between…
[conventional conditions]
… a small bowl of organic ice cream and a chocolate chip cookie, and she 
chose to eat the chocolate chip cookie.
... an organic chocolate chip cookie and a small bowl of ice cream, and she 
chose to eat the ice cream.
[organic conditions]
… a small bowl of ice cream and an organic chocolate chip cookie, and 
she chose to eat the organic chocolate chip cookie.
… a chocolate chip cookie and a small bowl of organic ice cream, and she 
chose to eat the organic ice cream.
[no-dessert control condition]
… a chocolate chip cookie and a small bowl of ice cream, and she chose to have 




Taken together, the five experimental studies comprising this dissertation 
contribute to the body of work demonstrating contextual influences on judgments and 
decisions about food (see Wansink, 2004 for a review), much of which focuses on how 
consumers process information presented on food packaging (e.g., Roe et al., 1999; 
Garretson & Burton, 2000; Kozup et al., 2003). In particular, this dissertation extends the 
literature on health halos from relative nutrition claims (e.g., “no cholesterol” and “low-
fat”) by demonstrating that values-based claims such as “organic” and “fair trade” 
(Barham, 2002) can bias a range of health-related inferences, despite being silent on 
nutrient content. Study 1 showed that merely describing a fictional brand of cookie as 
“organic” reduced calorie judgments relative to an otherwise-identical description. Study 
2 replicated this effect using a real-world cookie brand (Oreo) and showed that this bias 
was larger among the pro-environmental, or those with claim-congruent values who 
likely feel positively toward the claim, a pattern that is consistent with the logic of halo 
effects (Asch, 1946). Examining the domain of social ethics, Study 3 found that 
describing chocolate as “fair-trade” reduced calorie judgments as well. Paralleling the 
“organic” findings, Study 4 showed that social ethics halos were larger among 
perceivers’ with strong ethical food values and further demonstrated negative health 
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halos among perceivers with incongruent personal values (i.e., perceivers with strong 
ethical food values judged unethically produced chocolate as higher-calorie). Extending 
beyond judgments of the food itself, Study 5 found that values-based claims can affect 
downstream choice outcomes, namely, the perceived importance of exercise: perceivers 
were more lenient toward a target person forgoing exercise when she had just chosen 
organic over conventional dessert, an effect that was again larger among the pro-
environmental. By demonstrating that the size and direction of these effects critically 
depends on the personal values of perceivers, these studies provide initial support for the 
proposed person values model, which highlights the importance of the interaction 
between the focal quality and personal values in the emergence of halo effects.
Further supporting the model, these healthy and unhealthy inferences appeared to 
mediate subsequent indulgent versus resistant choice outcomes. In Study 2, calorie 
judgments mediated the effect of organic claim on consumption recommendations, and in 
Study 4, the interaction effect of ethical production information and personal ethical food 
values on consumption recommendations was attenuated when calorie judgments were 
controlled for. Although there are rational reasons to endorse higher consumption for 
organic and socially ethical foods, these data suggest that unwarranted healthy inferences, 
here in the form of reduced calorie judgments, contributed to the effects. 
True halo effects?
Although researchers have questioned whether prior halo findings represent 
“true” halo effects as opposed to more deliberate reasoning on the part of perceivers 
(Klein & Dawar, 2004), the present data appear to reflect genuine halo effects. First, halo 
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theory assumes that perceivers have a strongly valenced reaction to the focal quality that 
gives rise to specific evaluations of a similar valence. The fact that the present effects did 
not emerge uniformly but instead were dependent on perceivers’ personal values, such 
that larger positive halos occurred among perceivers with congruent personal values who 
presumably feel positively toward the values/ethics information, is consistent with halo 
logic. Past work has typically focused on central qualities (e.g., physical beauty) that 
evoke positive inferences across perceivers (Dion et al., 1972). The values/ethics 
information studied here may be better conceived as peripheral qualities (Asch, 1946) 
that elicit varying reactions across perceivers—as such, values-based claims provide a 
useful domain for examining this often overlooked assumption of halo effects. Second, as 
others have noted, it is difficult to separate halo effects from nomological effects when 
the halo source and evaluation dimension are proximal (Klein & Dawar, 2004), as they 
are in prior work demonstrating that relative nutrition claims bias nutrient inferences 
(e.g., “low-fat”  “low-calorie”; Wansink & Chandon, 2006a); in other words, it may be 
rational to infer that cookies with less fat (a calorie-dense nutrient) contain fewer 
calories.16  That “organic” and other production qualities biased inferences about nutrient  
content thus provides stronger support for a halo interpretation because it is much less 
rational to infer that a food contains fewer calories simply because it was organically 
produced. Finally, although this work was not designed to assess the extent of their 
influence over specific evaluations, that values-based claims influenced a wide range of 
health-related judgments (e.g., calorie judgments, appropriate consumption frequency, 
importance of exercise) is also indicative of halo effects (Kelley, 1950). 
16 In reality, however, foods labeled “low-fat” are unlikely to contain fewer calories because snack food 
manufacturers typically replace calories from fat with calories from added sugars for taste enhancement 
(Wansink & Chandon, 2006a).
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Implications for dual-process models of judgment
How do people reason about ethical foods? Throughout, I have argued that 
values-based halos reflect an “ethical” = “good”/“healthy” heuristic that underlies these 
unwarranted health-related inferences. The possibility of this heuristic is supported by 
survey data showing that most Americans see ethical foods as healthier (e.g., Harris 
Interactive, 2007) and that calorie estimation is notoriously difficult (e.g., Livingstone & 
Black, 2003; Berman & Lavizzo-Mourey, 2008), a situation that generally encourages the 
use of heuristics in judgment (Stanovich & West, 2000; Kahneman, 2003). 
A large body of literature in psychology and economics has explored the 
conditions under which people are likely to rely on heuristics as opposed to more 
systematic and analytic information processing. In social psychology, research on the 
processing of persuasive messages (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Cacioppo et al., 1986; see 
Chaiken & Trope, 1999 for a review) suggests that effects on attitudes and opinions 
depend on the personal relevance of messages. When messages are personally relevant, 
perceivers are typically influenced by central information (e.g., strong arguments) 
because high relevance leads to deeper and more analytic information processing. In 
contrast, when messages are less personally relevant, perceivers are typically more 
influenced by peripheral cues (e.g., likeability of the spokesperson) because low 
relevance evokes shallower processing and greater reliance on rules-of-thumb. 
Many other models of judgment similarly posit the existence of two largely 
distinct systems of human reasoning: one that is relatively rapid, automatic, associative, 
and cognitively undemanding, and one that is relatively slow, controlled, analytic, and 
cognitively demanding (e.g., Evans, 1984; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; 
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Sloman, 1996), termed System 1 and System 2, respectively (Stanovich & West, 2000). 
The present results, which show larger halos when values/ethics information is personally 
relevant, seemingly contradict what many dual-process theories would predict—that 
heuristic biases such as halo effects should be less pronounced among perceivers for 
whom they are personally relevant, because personal relevance typically invites System 2 
processing rather than simple associative heuristics. 
So why do heuristics seem to trump deliberative processing here? One possibility 
is that the domain of values-based claims differs in significant ways from those typically 
examined in research on dual-process models. When it comes to values-based claims, 
high personal relevance is likely to be correlated with both positive affect and greater 
knowledge in real life—in contrast with laboratory work that experimentally manipulates 
these variables in isolation to examine the effect of relevance on heuristic- versus 
deliberative processing (e.g., Chaiken, 1980). Values-based claims are also highly 
politicized, given that they are intended to promote progressive socioeconomic values in 
the marketplace (Raynolds, 2000). This politicization may increase pressure to justify 
one’s support for these claims whenever possible, and judging “organic” foods as lower-
calorie may be one way to do so. Finally, the relative calorie and consumption judgments 
featured here were highly ambiguous judgments. Unlike cases where judges neglect 
objective information such as base rates in favor of a heuristic (e.g,, how representative a 
target is of its class; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), the absence of an objectively correct 
answer on the judgments featured here could lead perceivers with claim-relevant values 




Beyond halo effects, this work is compatible with other literatures in psychology 
and consumer research. Research finds that corporate social responsibility similarly 
promotes positive inferences that may sometimes be unwarranted, such as lower 
attributions of blame during a subsequent product-harm crisis, that can mediate brand 
evaluations and purchase intentions; like the present findings, these positive inferences 
are generally more pronounced among consumers who value the specific domain of 
social responsibility (Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001; Klein & Dawar, 2004). Extending and 
paralleling this prior work, this dissertation suggests that corporate halos may extend 
beyond evaluations of the company or brand to affect judgments about the content and 
health consequences of its products, a point that is increasingly relevant in an age of high-
profile product recalls due to public health concerns (e.g., Zhao, Lee, Ng, & Flynn, 2009; 
Cusumano, 2011).
More generally, these studies complement past work on the importance of identity 
processes in consumer preference and choice (Aaker, 1997; Belk, 1988; Kleine, Kleine, 
& Kernan, 1993). For instance, people prefer products that share the letters of their name 
(e.g., Brendl, Chattopadhyay, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2005) and that communicate in-group 
belonging (e.g., Berger & Health, 2007), findings that are consistent with the general 
tendency to prefer objects associated with the self and valued groups. According to the 
identity-based motivation model, these options are preferred because they feel identity-
congruent, reflecting the “kind of person I am” (Oyserman, 2009); importantly, these 
preferences are thought to be highly context-dependent because identities themselves are 
dynamic and can shift in response to salient environmental cues (e.g., Shih, Pittinsky, & 
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Ambady, 1999; Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, & Chen, 2009; Elmore & Oyserman, in 
press). Presumably, values/ethics information on food packaging functions as a context 
cue that triggers relevant identities, leading perceivers to judge products through a lens of 
identity-congruence or –incongruence, fostering favorable or unfavorable evaluations 
(manifesting here as healthy or unhealthy inferences, respectively). 
Although the current studies operationalized personal values as chronic individual 
differences, temporarily accessible values may play a role in values-based halos as well. 
In line with an identity-based motivation perspective, personal values in the present 
model are conceived as a product of more stable identities and identities cued in the 
immediate situation (see Oyserman, 2009, for a discussion of context-sensitive identities 
and consumer values). Recent research demonstrates that values commonly assumed to 
be deeply held—such as religious values—can be activated in situ by subtle cues, both 
subliminal (e.g., religious words flashed on a computer screen; Pichon, Boccato, & 
Saroglou, 2007) and supraliminal (e.g., standing in a church; Rutchick, 2010), promoting 
judgments and behaviors that are consistent with these cued values (e.g., voting to ban 
same-sex marriage). In line with this situated cognition perspective, activating claim-
relevant values in context—say, by having perceivers judge organic foods while standing 
in a pristine outdoor landscape or after watching a nature film—may foster positive or 
negative health halos as a function of their congruence or incongruence with the focal 
claim. Future work may fruitfully explore this possibility.
Identity-based motivation may also help explain why unwarranted positive 
inferences may occur in the face of superior domain knowledge as the present data 
suggest. According to the model, identity-based motivation involves a cognitive-
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procedural readiness to engage in heuristic rather than systematic processing, consistent 
with the present findings. Although the current work focuses mainly on health-related 
judgments rather than health-related choices (Oyserman et al., 2009; McFerran, Dahl, 
Fitzsimmons, & Morales, 2010), it suggests that in some situations identity-based 
inferences may mediate healthy and unhealthy choices. 
Beyond preference for identity-congruent products, these findings fit with the 
large social psychological literature on self-enhancement biases. Much research, 
particularly in the United States and other Western cultures, makes the basic assumption 
that people are motivated to maintain a positive view of the self (Kunda, 1999). This 
drive to preserve and enhance self-esteem is thought to underlie numerous cognitive 
biases that have been demonstrated empirically. These include overly optimistic 
judgments about the self, such as overconfidence in our abilities (Dunning, Johnson, 
Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003) and unrealistic optimism about our future outcomes (Kruger 
& Burrus, 2004). These also include motivated perceptual biases during intergroup 
conflict that lead us to see the ingroup—a significant source of self-esteem (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979)—in an especially positive light, as when we fail to notice violations 
committed by a favored sports team (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954). As extensions of the self 
(Belk, 1988), people may be similarly motivated to view identity-congruent products 
through rose-colored glasses that distort by magnifying virtues and overlooking flaws. 
This may be especially likely when the products convey values associated with favored 
political movements and ingroups. 
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Boundary conditions
While this work illuminates some of the conditions under which these halos 
emerge, it leaves a number of questions unanswered. Here I focus on two questions with 
interesting practical and theoretical implications. The first concerns food type: would 
values-based claims influence judgments of fresh produce (fruits and vegetables) as they 
do for hedonic snack foods? The second concerns whether values-based claims would 
always reduce calorie judgments: could “organic” foods ever be judged as higher-calorie  
among pro-environmental perceivers? 
The present work featured poor nutrition foods primarily in keeping with past 
research into how consumers misinterpret food labels in unhealthy ways (e.g., Wansink 
& Chandon, 2006a), so although not tested here, it is unlikely that fresh produce would 
be judged as lower-calorie when described as “organic.” Foods like apples and spinach 
are normally considered healthy and are likely to be seen as relatively low-calorie and 
appropriate for frequent consumption regardless of one’s personal values, rendering any 
incremental halo evoked by values-based claims trivial. In contrast, hedonic foods like 
cookies and chocolate are normally considered unhealthy, providing room for pro-
environmentalists to judge these organic snacks as healthier. Moreover, people may be 
motivated to seek an excuse for indulging in hedonic foods, further supporting 
unwarranted positive inferences. In addition, conversational implicature (Grice, 1975; 
Schwarz, 1996) is especially applicable to man-made (versus more natural) foods: 
whereas consumers may infer that producers who care about the environment or the 
welfare of their workers probably manufacture healthier products, this logic is less 
applicable to more natural products like fruits and vegetables, which are perceived as 
63
being produced with less human involvement (Rozin et al., 1996). Even if values-based 
halos are restricted to less nutritious processed foods, this work has practical implications 
by identifying additional factors that may lead well-intentioned dieters to overeat.
More theoretically relevant, could values-based claims ever evoke “unhealthy” 
inferences (e.g., “organic”  “high-calorie”)? Halo logic would suggest yes. Whereas 
Western culture views calorie restriction as a generally healthy and positive attribute of 
foods (perhaps especially of hedonic foods) (Crawford & Krebs, 2008), this is unlikely to 
be the case across cultures and throughout history where dieting is not normative 
(Stearns, 2002). That is, “low-calorie” is not an inherently healthy or positive quality of 
food because the meaning of healthy is highly situated and context-dependent. Thus, in 
contexts where “high-calorie” is seen as healthy or positive—say in developing nations 
suffering from widespread malnourishment or among products intended to promote 
weight gain (e.g., protein shakes)—halo logic would predict calorie inferences that are 
opposite of those reported here. Future work demonstrating these effects would provide 
further support for the person values model as highly situated. 
Finally, if these effects reflect heuristic processes that are rooted in identity-
relevance, what does this mean for “turning off” these effects? If perceivers with claim-
congruent personal values are in fact more knowledgeable about the focal values/ethics 
information, then it should be possible to attenuate these biases by interrupting heuristic 
processing and encouraging more deliberative processing. Calling attention to heuristic 
sources has been shown to attenuate their influence on subsequent judgments (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983; Wilson & Brekke, 1994); likewise, I expect that asking perceivers to 
consciously reflect on whether production-related qualities like “organic” bear on nutrient 
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content immediately before providing a calorie judgment would diminish their effect. 
Limitations and future directions
In addition to leaving some questions unanswered, this work is limited in that it 
focuses on judgments and does not address actual consumption. However, the present 
findings suggest that corresponding consumption effects would follow, given that 
lowered calorie estimates and increased consumption often go hand-in-hand (e.g., 
Wansink & Chandon, 2006a; Chandon & Wansink, 2007). Nevertheless, in order to make 
a strong case for relevance to the obesity crisis, future work should test whether values-
based claims lead people actually overindulge in poor nutrition foods.
Beyond health-related inferences, future studies could also explore the influence 
of values-based halos on basic perceptual processes, such as taste. Despite having 
sufficient and independent information for the judgment (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), 
claim-congruent values might improve subjective taste experience whereas claim-
incongruent values might worsen it, processes that may increase or decrease actual 
consumption independent of the health-related inferences examined here. This possibility 
is suggested by recent findings showing strong effects of food packaging on taste 
preferences—for instance, children prefer the taste of carrots placed in McDonalds 
packaging (Robinson, Borzekowski, Matheson, & Kraemer, 2007) and the taste of snacks 
from packages emblazoned with familiar cartoon characters (Roberto, Baik, Harris, & 
Brownell, 2010). Echoing the classic “new look” perspective in perception (e.g., Bruner, 
1957), these and other recent findings beyond the food domain (e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 
2010; Caruso, Mead, & Balcetis, 2009) remind us that our values can powerfully shape 
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our most basic sensory experiences.  
Finally, although these findings imply larger halos among individuals with greater 
domain knowledge (who should be protected from these biases), this needs to be 
established empirically. It is possible that high scores on measures of pro-environmental 
and ethical food values primarily reflect self-identification (and positive valuation) rather 
than greater domain knowledge. So for instance, future work should replicate the present 
findings and include measures of objective domain knowledge (e.g., an assessment of 
meaning of “organic”), to test whether perceivers who show larger organic halos (the pro-
environmental) are in fact more knowledgeable about the meaning of the claim, 
knowledge that in principle should buffer these individuals from unwarranted inferences.
Implications for government oversight
 This work may hold relevance to the ongoing debate over government regulation 
of food claims (Nestle, 2002; Brownell & Horgen, 2004). In particular, the recent rise of 
advertising claims on the front of food packaging has fueled concerns that consumers 
may perceive foods as healthier than they really are. These include traditional relative 
nutrition claims (e.g., “low cholesterol”) as well as more recent “front of package” 
schemes, or labels developed by companies and independent organizations to highlight 
healthy aspects of the product (e.g., “Smart Choices” labels on cereal boxes) (Pomeranz, 
2011). Although the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has established both voluntary 
and mandatory guidelines for such claims and has a mandate to enforce their accuracy, 
research finds that health claims commonly occur on foods with little nutritional value 
(Harris, Schwartz, Brownell, et al., 2009). 
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Despite high demand for ethical foods, there is relatively little oversight of 
values-based claims, “organic” being the notable exception. The National Organic 
Program administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture oversees the use of organic 
claims on food packaging, enforcing a three-tiered labeling system stipulating when 
foods can be described as “made with organic ingredients,” “organic,” and “100% 
organic” (USDA, 2010). Meanwhile, other values-based labels have proliferated in the 
marketplace (e.g., “fair trade certified,” “bird friendly,” “rainforest alliance certified”), 
which are typically administered by independent non-profit organizations that certify 
producers and enforce labeling standards (e.g., Fairtrade International). However, some 
common claims—such as “locally produced”—currently lack certification standards 
(although there have been calls to change this; e.g., Hand, 2011), making it easy for 
unscrupulous producers to benefit from “local” labeling when their products in fact travel 
long distances to market. To the extent that these claims similarly bias judgments in 
unhealthy ways, the government might seek to regulate their appearance on poor nutrition 
foods as they currently do for other types of claims (Pomeranz, 2011).17 Future work may 
fruitfully establish whether and under what conditions these claims evoke unwarranted 
healthy inferences.
Finally, the extent of values-based claims’ role in the obesity crisis may seem 
questionable given that obesity has been shown to be more prevalent among low-SES 
individuals (see Sobal & Strunkard, 1989 for a review) while organic and fair trade foods 
are accessible mainly to those with higher incomes due to cost constraints (e.g., 
17 The FDA currently disqualifies producers from making explicit health claims on packages such as 
“Eating a bowl of whole grain cereal daily can significantly cut your risk of cancer” if the food contains 
high levels of unhealthy nutrients (e.g., more than 13 grams of fat per serving) (see Pomeranz, 2011 for a 
discussion). 
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Thompson, 1998; Padel, 2005). However, more recent analyses suggest that obesity rates 
have increased among all income, age, and racial/ethnic groups (Baskin, Ard, Franklin, & 
Allison, 2005) and that the SES divide on obesity has fallen precipitously over the past 
couple of decades (Zhang & Wang, 2004). Americans from all backgrounds are 
struggling to cut calories in order to lose weight and improve their health. In everyday 
judgments and decisions, those who can afford them may treat organic foods and other 
ethically produced foods as health foods that are lower-calorie when in fact this is 




In sum, this dissertation provides evidence that values-based food claims such as 
“organic” can lead perceivers to unwarranted inferences about nutrient content and health 
consequences. In contrast to previous research examining health halos from relative 
nutrition claims such as “low-fat” (Wansink & Chandon, 2006a), the present work 
demonstrates that similar inferential biases can occur between more distal concepts that 
lack a logical relation: whereas “low-calorie” inferences can justifiably follow from 
“low-fat” claims, they do not follow from values-based claims such as “organic” and 
“fair trade,” which signal progressive production-related qualities that are silent on 
calorie content (Barham, 2002). Moreover, findings across multiple experiments suggest 
that health halos from values-based claims critically depend on personal values: positive 
halos (e.g., “organic”  “lower-calorie”) were larger among perceivers whose personal 
values matched the focal quality (e.g., the pro-environmental), who likely feel positively 
toward the claim in the first place and who may be motivated to see those foods as 
virtuous. Conversely, negative halos (e.g., unethically produced  “higher-calorie”) 
were larger among perceivers whose personal values clashed with the target quality (e.g., 
those reporting high ethical food values). Thus, the focal values/ethical information did 
not cast a uniform effect on specific evaluations across perceivers but did so as a function 
of perceivers’ attitudes toward that information, consistent with the logic of halo effects 
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(Asch, 1946). These specific inferences in turn appeared to mediate downstream choice 
outcomes such as consumption recommendations, consistent with the situated cognition 
perspective that concepts activated in context are brought to bear on related judgments 
and decisions at hand (Smith & Semin, 2004). Thus, in the case of positive health halos, 
these unwarranted inferences may nudge perceivers to indulge more than they otherwise 
would, possibly contributing to weight gain.
By demonstrating that values-based food claims can bias health-related judgments 
including calorie estimation, consumption recommendations, and exercise 
recommendations, this dissertation research carries important theoretical and applied 
implications. It suggests that the virtual absence of governmental oversight of values-
based claims on food packaging (besides “organic”) may deserve a second look, given 
that consumers may misinterpret these claims in unhealthy ways. It also challenges the 
prevailing view that personal relevance evokes more deliberative processing and less 
reliance upon the heuristics in judgment (Stanovich & West, 2000), a potentially 
promising area for future research.
Because it focuses primarily on judgment effects, this work invites a number of 
open questions that can be pursued as part of an ongoing research program. Do values-
based claims affect actual consumption and for whom? Are parents willing to indulge 
their child’s request for sweet snacks if they are “organic” or “fair trade”? Does the 
consumption of ethical foods license unhealthy behaviors in real-world contexts? Having 
explored some underlying cognitive processes, this research serves as a foundation for 
addressing these more applied behavioral questions, which are increasingly relevant in 
our world of bigger bodies and expanding selections of ethical foods.  
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